Page 2
his freedom of movement, while enemy nationals are frequently called into the This scheme was put into practice by I. G. officials all over the world. The specific legal devices used to place ownership apparently in the hands of independent persons and yet at the same time to retain effective control for I. G. were many and varied. For instance, sometimes they required the buyer of the shares to sign an option agreement giving I. G. an irrevocable right to repurchase his shares without notice. Often the prospective buyer chosen by I. G. would not have sufficient funds to acquire the shares. In such cases I. G. would lend the money to him and require him to sign, in addition to the option agreement: (a) An acknowledgment that the funds used had been loaned to him by I. G., and that I. G. was authorized to acquire his shares in cancellation of the loan; and (6) A dividend agreement whereby the shareholder (who usually paid I. G. an interest of 6 percent on his loan) agreed to pay to I. G. any dividends received on his shares in excess of 6 percent, while I. G. agreed that the shareholder would receive à dividend rate of not less than 6 percent. It should be noted that by camouflaging companies in which I. G. had a direct interest, any subsidiaries of these companies were by the same token also camouflaged. Many other examples could be cited in which the most varied legal artifices were used: Nominees, fictitious or intervening transfers, pool agreements, endorsements in blank, escrow deposits, pledges, collateral loans, right of first refusal, management contracts, service contracts, creditor's rights, withheld know-how, and other devices. One reason advanced by officials of I. G. for the extreme lengths to which the technique of camouflage was carried was that Hermann Schmitz made every effort to live up to the sobriquet ascribed to him by some of his leading associates, “the master of financial camou At least in the early years of the war, the architects were satisfied with their handiwork, for in 1940 they were able to inform the German Government that their measures for camouflage "have proved to be very good during the war, and have even surpassed our expectations in numerous cases." ; It is interesting to note that the German tax authorities themselves were not informed of the details of these protective measures and from time to time attempted to assess the extent of I. G.'s foreign holdings. On one occasion they were urged by the company's lawyers, however, that injury to German interests could easily result from prosecuting such inquiries, and in the end the authorities did refrain from further investigation. The reasons for the refusal given at the time (to the tax authorities by I. G. officials) were that they feared most severe economic damage would result which must also have a detrimental effect on the German economy and on the German Page 3Page 4
his freedom of movement, while enemy nationals are frequently called into the This scheme was put into practice by I. G. officials all over the world. The specific legal devices used to place ownership apparently in the hands of independent persons and yet at the same time to retain effective control for I. G. were many and varied. For instance, sometimes they required the buyer of the shares to sign an option agreement giving I. G. an irrevocable right to repurchase his shares without notice. Often the prospective buyer chosen by I. G. would not have sufficient funds to acquire the shares. In such cases I. G. would lend the money to him and require him to sign, in addition to the option agreement: (a) An acknowledgment that the funds used had been loaned to him by I. G., and that I. G. was authorized to acquire his shares in cancellation of the loan; and (6) A dividend agreement whereby the shareholder (who usually paid I. G. an interest of 6 percent on his loan) agreed to pay to I. G. any dividends received on his shares in excess of 6 percent, while I. G. agreed that the shareholder would receive à dividend rate of not less than 6 percent. It should be noted that by camouflaging companies in which I. G. had a direct interest, any subsidiaries of these companies were by the same token also camouflaged. Many other examples could be cited in which the most varied legal artifices were used: Nominees, fictitious or intervening transfers, pool agreements, endorsements in blank, escrow deposits, pledges, collateral loans, right of first refusal, management contracts, service contracts, creditor's rights, withheld know-how, and other devices. One reason advanced by officials of I. G. for the extreme lengths to which the technique of camouflage was carried was that Hermann Schmitz made every effort to live up to the sobriquet ascribed to him by some of his leading associates, “the master of financial camou At least in the early years of the war, the architects were satisfied with their handiwork, for in 1940 they were able to inform the German Government that their measures for camouflage "have proved to be very good during the war, and have even surpassed our expectations in numerous cases." ; It is interesting to note that the German tax authorities themselves were not informed of the details of these protective measures and from time to time attempted to assess the extent of I. G.'s foreign holdings. On one occasion they were urged by the company's lawyers, however, that injury to German interests could easily result from prosecuting such inquiries, and in the end the authorities did refrain from further investigation. The reasons for the refusal given at the time (to the tax authorities by I. G. officials) were that they feared most severe economic damage would result which must also have a detrimental effect on the German economy and on the German Page 5Page 6
his freedom of movement, while enemy nationals are frequently called into the This scheme was put into practice by I. G. officials all over the world. The specific legal devices used to place ownership apparently in the hands of independent persons and yet at the same time to retain effective control for I. G. were many and varied. For instance, sometimes they required the buyer of the shares to sign an option agreement giving I. G. an irrevocable right to repurchase his shares without notice. Often the prospective buyer chosen by I. G. would not have sufficient funds to acquire the shares. In such cases I. G. would lend the money to him and require him to sign, in addition to the option agreement: (a) An acknowledgment that the funds used had been loaned to him by I. G., and that I. G. was authorized to acquire his shares in cancellation of the loan; and (6) A dividend agreement whereby the shareholder (who usually paid I. G. an interest of 6 percent on his loan) agreed to pay to I. G. any dividends received on his shares in excess of 6 percent, while I. G. agreed that the shareholder would receive à dividend rate of not less than 6 percent. It should be noted that by camouflaging companies in which I. G. had a direct interest, any subsidiaries of these companies were by the same token also camouflaged. Many other examples could be cited in which the most varied legal artifices were used: Nominees, fictitious or intervening transfers, pool agreements, endorsements in blank, escrow deposits, pledges, collateral loans, right of first refusal, management contracts, service contracts, creditor's rights, withheld know-how, and other devices. One reason advanced by officials of I. G. for the extreme lengths to which the technique of camouflage was carried was that Hermann Schmitz made every effort to live up to the sobriquet ascribed to him by some of his leading associates, “the master of financial camou At least in the early years of the war, the architects were satisfied with their handiwork, for in 1940 they were able to inform the German Government that their measures for camouflage "have proved to be very good during the war, and have even surpassed our expectations in numerous cases." ; It is interesting to note that the German tax authorities themselves were not informed of the details of these protective measures and from time to time attempted to assess the extent of I. G.'s foreign holdings. On one occasion they were urged by the company's lawyers, however, that injury to German interests could easily result from prosecuting such inquiries, and in the end the authorities did refrain from further investigation. The reasons for the refusal given at the time (to the tax authorities by I. G. officials) were that they feared most severe economic damage would result which must also have a detrimental effect on the German economy and on the German Page 7Page 8
his freedom of movement, while enemy nationals are frequently called into the This scheme was put into practice by I. G. officials all over the world. The specific legal devices used to place ownership apparently in the hands of independent persons and yet at the same time to retain effective control for I. G. were many and varied. For instance, sometimes they required the buyer of the shares to sign an option agreement giving I. G. an irrevocable right to repurchase his shares without notice. Often the prospective buyer chosen by I. G. would not have sufficient funds to acquire the shares. In such cases I. G. would lend the money to him and require him to sign, in addition to the option agreement: (a) An acknowledgment that the funds used had been loaned to him by I. G., and that I. G. was authorized to acquire his shares in cancellation of the loan; and (6) A dividend agreement whereby the shareholder (who usually paid I. G. an interest of 6 percent on his loan) agreed to pay to I. G. any dividends received on his shares in excess of 6 percent, while I. G. agreed that the shareholder would receive à dividend rate of not less than 6 percent. It should be noted that by camouflaging companies in which I. G. had a direct interest, any subsidiaries of these companies were by the same token also camouflaged. Many other examples could be cited in which the most varied legal artifices were used: Nominees, fictitious or intervening transfers, pool agreements, endorsements in blank, escrow deposits, pledges, collateral loans, right of first refusal, management contracts, service contracts, creditor's rights, withheld know-how, and other devices. One reason advanced by officials of I. G. for the extreme lengths to which the technique of camouflage was carried was that Hermann Schmitz made every effort to live up to the sobriquet ascribed to him by some of his leading associates, “the master of financial camou At least in the early years of the war, the architects were satisfied with their handiwork, for in 1940 they were able to inform the German Government that their measures for camouflage "have proved to be very good during the war, and have even surpassed our expectations in numerous cases." ; It is interesting to note that the German tax authorities themselves were not informed of the details of these protective measures and from time to time attempted to assess the extent of I. G.'s foreign holdings. On one occasion they were urged by the company's lawyers, however, that injury to German interests could easily result from prosecuting such inquiries, and in the end the authorities did refrain from further investigation. The reasons for the refusal given at the time (to the tax authorities by I. G. officials) were that they feared most severe economic damage would result which must also have a detrimental effect on the German economy and on the German Page 9Page 10
his freedom of movement, while enemy nationals are frequently called into the This scheme was put into practice by I. G. officials all over the world. The specific legal devices used to place ownership apparently in the hands of independent persons and yet at the same time to retain effective control for I. G. were many and varied. For instance, sometimes they required the buyer of the shares to sign an option agreement giving I. G. an irrevocable right to repurchase his shares without notice. Often the prospective buyer chosen by I. G. would not have sufficient funds to acquire the shares. In such cases I. G. would lend the money to him and require him to sign, in addition to the option agreement: (a) An acknowledgment that the funds used had been loaned to him by I. G., and that I. G. was authorized to acquire his shares in cancellation of the loan; and (6) A dividend agreement whereby the shareholder (who usually paid I. G. an interest of 6 percent on his loan) agreed to pay to I. G. any dividends received on his shares in excess of 6 percent, while I. G. agreed that the shareholder would receive à dividend rate of not less than 6 percent. It should be noted that by camouflaging companies in which I. G. had a direct interest, any subsidiaries of these companies were by the same token also camouflaged. Many other examples could be cited in which the most varied legal artifices were used: Nominees, fictitious or intervening transfers, pool agreements, endorsements in blank, escrow deposits, pledges, collateral loans, right of first refusal, management contracts, service contracts, creditor's rights, withheld know-how, and other devices. One reason advanced by officials of I. G. for the extreme lengths to which the technique of camouflage was carried was that Hermann Schmitz made every effort to live up to the sobriquet ascribed to him by some of his leading associates, “the master of financial camou At least in the early years of the war, the architects were satisfied with their handiwork, for in 1940 they were able to inform the German Government that their measures for camouflage "have proved to be very good during the war, and have even surpassed our expectations in numerous cases." ; It is interesting to note that the German tax authorities themselves were not informed of the details of these protective measures and from time to time attempted to assess the extent of I. G.'s foreign holdings. On one occasion they were urged by the company's lawyers, however, that injury to German interests could easily result from prosecuting such inquiries, and in the end the authorities did refrain from further investigation. The reasons for the refusal given at the time (to the tax authorities by I. G. officials) were that they feared most severe economic damage would result which must also have a detrimental effect on the German economy and on the German Page 11Page 12
his freedom of movement, while enemy nationals are frequently called into the This scheme was put into practice by I. G. officials all over the world. The specific legal devices used to place ownership apparently in the hands of independent persons and yet at the same time to retain effective control for I. G. were many and varied. For instance, sometimes they required the buyer of the shares to sign an option agreement giving I. G. an irrevocable right to repurchase his shares without notice. Often the prospective buyer chosen by I. G. would not have sufficient funds to acquire the shares. In such cases I. G. would lend the money to him and require him to sign, in addition to the option agreement: (a) An acknowledgment that the funds used had been loaned to him by I. G., and that I. G. was authorized to acquire his shares in cancellation of the loan; and (6) A dividend agreement whereby the shareholder (who usually paid I. G. an interest of 6 percent on his loan) agreed to pay to I. G. any dividends received on his shares in excess of 6 percent, while I. G. agreed that the shareholder would receive à dividend rate of not less than 6 percent. It should be noted that by camouflaging companies in which I. G. had a direct interest, any subsidiaries of these companies were by the same token also camouflaged. Many other examples could be cited in which the most varied legal artifices were used: Nominees, fictitious or intervening transfers, pool agreements, endorsements in blank, escrow deposits, pledges, collateral loans, right of first refusal, management contracts, service contracts, creditor's rights, withheld know-how, and other devices. One reason advanced by officials of I. G. for the extreme lengths to which the technique of camouflage was carried was that Hermann Schmitz made every effort to live up to the sobriquet ascribed to him by some of his leading associates, “the master of financial camou At least in the early years of the war, the architects were satisfied with their handiwork, for in 1940 they were able to inform the German Government that their measures for camouflage "have proved to be very good during the war, and have even surpassed our expectations in numerous cases." ; It is interesting to note that the German tax authorities themselves were not informed of the details of these protective measures and from time to time attempted to assess the extent of I. G.'s foreign holdings. On one occasion they were urged by the company's lawyers, however, that injury to German interests could easily result from prosecuting such inquiries, and in the end the authorities did refrain from further investigation. The reasons for the refusal given at the time (to the tax authorities by I. G. officials) were that they feared most severe economic damage would result which must also have a detrimental effect on the German economy and on the German Page 13Page 14
his freedom of movement, while enemy nationals are frequently called into the This scheme was put into practice by I. G. officials all over the world. The specific legal devices used to place ownership apparently in the hands of independent persons and yet at the same time to retain effective control for I. G. were many and varied. For instance, sometimes they required the buyer of the shares to sign an option agreement giving I. G. an irrevocable right to repurchase his shares without notice. Often the prospective buyer chosen by I. G. would not have sufficient funds to acquire the shares. In such cases I. G. would lend the money to him and require him to sign, in addition to the option agreement: (a) An acknowledgment that the funds used had been loaned to him by I. G., and that I. G. was authorized to acquire his shares in cancellation of the loan; and (6) A dividend agreement whereby the shareholder (who usually paid I. G. an interest of 6 percent on his loan) agreed to pay to I. G. any dividends received on his shares in excess of 6 percent, while I. G. agreed that the shareholder would receive à dividend rate of not less than 6 percent. It should be noted that by camouflaging companies in which I. G. had a direct interest, any subsidiaries of these companies were by the same token also camouflaged. Many other examples could be cited in which the most varied legal artifices were used: Nominees, fictitious or intervening transfers, pool agreements, endorsements in blank, escrow deposits, pledges, collateral loans, right of first refusal, management contracts, service contracts, creditor's rights, withheld know-how, and other devices. One reason advanced by officials of I. G. for the extreme lengths to which the technique of camouflage was carried was that Hermann Schmitz made every effort to live up to the sobriquet ascribed to him by some of his leading associates, “the master of financial camou At least in the early years of the war, the architects were satisfied with their handiwork, for in 1940 they were able to inform the German Government that their measures for camouflage "have proved to be very good during the war, and have even surpassed our expectations in numerous cases." ; It is interesting to note that the German tax authorities themselves were not informed of the details of these protective measures and from time to time attempted to assess the extent of I. G.'s foreign holdings. On one occasion they were urged by the company's lawyers, however, that injury to German interests could easily result from prosecuting such inquiries, and in the end the authorities did refrain from further investigation. The reasons for the refusal given at the time (to the tax authorities by I. G. officials) were that they feared most severe economic damage would result which must also have a detrimental effect on the German economy and on the German Page 15Page 16
his freedom of movement, while enemy nationals are frequently called into the This scheme was put into practice by I. G. officials all over the world. The specific legal devices used to place ownership apparently in the hands of independent persons and yet at the same time to retain effective control for I. G. were many and varied. For instance, sometimes they required the buyer of the shares to sign an option agreement giving I. G. an irrevocable right to repurchase his shares without notice. Often the prospective buyer chosen by I. G. would not have sufficient funds to acquire the shares. In such cases I. G. would lend the money to him and require him to sign, in addition to the option agreement: (a) An acknowledgment that the funds used had been loaned to him by I. G., and that I. G. was authorized to acquire his shares in cancellation of the loan; and (6) A dividend agreement whereby the shareholder (who usually paid I. G. an interest of 6 percent on his loan) agreed to pay to I. G. any dividends received on his shares in excess of 6 percent, while I. G. agreed that the shareholder would receive à dividend rate of not less than 6 percent. It should be noted that by camouflaging companies in which I. G. had a direct interest, any subsidiaries of these companies were by the same token also camouflaged. Many other examples could be cited in which the most varied legal artifices were used: Nominees, fictitious or intervening transfers, pool agreements, endorsements in blank, escrow deposits, pledges, collateral loans, right of first refusal, management contracts, service contracts, creditor's rights, withheld know-how, and other devices. One reason advanced by officials of I. G. for the extreme lengths to which the technique of camouflage was carried was that Hermann Schmitz made every effort to live up to the sobriquet ascribed to him by some of his leading associates, “the master of financial camou At least in the early years of the war, the architects were satisfied with their handiwork, for in 1940 they were able to inform the German Government that their measures for camouflage "have proved to be very good during the war, and have even surpassed our expectations in numerous cases." ; It is interesting to note that the German tax authorities themselves were not informed of the details of these protective measures and from time to time attempted to assess the extent of I. G.'s foreign holdings. On one occasion they were urged by the company's lawyers, however, that injury to German interests could easily result from prosecuting such inquiries, and in the end the authorities did refrain from further investigation. The reasons for the refusal given at the time (to the tax authorities by I. G. officials) were that they feared most severe economic damage would result which must also have a detrimental effect on the German economy and on the German Page 17Page 18
his freedom of movement, while enemy nationals are frequently called into the This scheme was put into practice by I. G. officials all over the world. The specific legal devices used to place ownership apparently in the hands of independent persons and yet at the same time to retain effective control for I. G. were many and varied. For instance, sometimes they required the buyer of the shares to sign an option agreement giving I. G. an irrevocable right to repurchase his shares without notice. Often the prospective buyer chosen by I. G. would not have sufficient funds to acquire the shares. In such cases I. G. would lend the money to him and require him to sign, in addition to the option agreement: (a) An acknowledgment that the funds used had been loaned to him by I. G., and that I. G. was authorized to acquire his shares in cancellation of the loan; and (6) A dividend agreement whereby the shareholder (who usually paid I. G. an interest of 6 percent on his loan) agreed to pay to I. G. any dividends received on his shares in excess of 6 percent, while I. G. agreed that the shareholder would receive à dividend rate of not less than 6 percent. It should be noted that by camouflaging companies in which I. G. had a direct interest, any subsidiaries of these companies were by the same token also camouflaged. Many other examples could be cited in which the most varied legal artifices were used: Nominees, fictitious or intervening transfers, pool agreements, endorsements in blank, escrow deposits, pledges, collateral loans, right of first refusal, management contracts, service contracts, creditor's rights, withheld know-how, and other devices. One reason advanced by officials of I. G. for the extreme lengths to which the technique of camouflage was carried was that Hermann Schmitz made every effort to live up to the sobriquet ascribed to him by some of his leading associates, “the master of financial camou At least in the early years of the war, the architects were satisfied with their handiwork, for in 1940 they were able to inform the German Government that their measures for camouflage "have proved to be very good during the war, and have even surpassed our expectations in numerous cases." ; It is interesting to note that the German tax authorities themselves were not informed of the details of these protective measures and from time to time attempted to assess the extent of I. G.'s foreign holdings. On one occasion they were urged by the company's lawyers, however, that injury to German interests could easily result from prosecuting such inquiries, and in the end the authorities did refrain from further investigation. The reasons for the refusal given at the time (to the tax authorities by I. G. officials) were that they feared most severe economic damage would result which must also have a detrimental effect on the German economy and on the German Page 19Page 20
his freedom of movement, while enemy nationals are frequently called into the This scheme was put into practice by I. G. officials all over the world. The specific legal devices used to place ownership apparently in the hands of independent persons and yet at the same time to retain effective control for I. G. were many and varied. For instance, sometimes they required the buyer of the shares to sign an option agreement giving I. G. an irrevocable right to repurchase his shares without notice. Often the prospective buyer chosen by I. G. would not have sufficient funds to acquire the shares. In such cases I. G. would lend the money to him and require him to sign, in addition to the option agreement: (a) An acknowledgment that the funds used had been loaned to him by I. G., and that I. G. was authorized to acquire his shares in cancellation of the loan; and (6) A dividend agreement whereby the shareholder (who usually paid I. G. an interest of 6 percent on his loan) agreed to pay to I. G. any dividends received on his shares in excess of 6 percent, while I. G. agreed that the shareholder would receive à dividend rate of not less than 6 percent. It should be noted that by camouflaging companies in which I. G. had a direct interest, any subsidiaries of these companies were by the same token also camouflaged. Many other examples could be cited in which the most varied legal artifices were used: Nominees, fictitious or intervening transfers, pool agreements, endorsements in blank, escrow deposits, pledges, collateral loans, right of first refusal, management contracts, service contracts, creditor's rights, withheld know-how, and other devices. One reason advanced by officials of I. G. for the extreme lengths to which the technique of camouflage was carried was that Hermann Schmitz made every effort to live up to the sobriquet ascribed to him by some of his leading associates, “the master of financial camou At least in the early years of the war, the architects were satisfied with their handiwork, for in 1940 they were able to inform the German Government that their measures for camouflage "have proved to be very good during the war, and have even surpassed our expectations in numerous cases." ; It is interesting to note that the German tax authorities themselves were not informed of the details of these protective measures and from time to time attempted to assess the extent of I. G.'s foreign holdings. On one occasion they were urged by the company's lawyers, however, that injury to German interests could easily result from prosecuting such inquiries, and in the end the authorities did refrain from further investigation. The reasons for the refusal given at the time (to the tax authorities by I. G. officials) were that they feared most severe economic damage would result which must also have a detrimental effect on the German economy and on the German Page 21Page 22
his freedom of movement, while enemy nationals are frequently called into the This scheme was put into practice by I. G. officials all over the world. The specific legal devices used to place ownership apparently in the hands of independent persons and yet at the same time to retain effective control for I. G. were many and varied. For instance, sometimes they required the buyer of the shares to sign an option agreement giving I. G. an irrevocable right to repurchase his shares without notice. Often the prospective buyer chosen by I. G. would not have sufficient funds to acquire the shares. In such cases I. G. would lend the money to him and require him to sign, in addition to the option agreement: (a) An acknowledgment that the funds used had been loaned to him by I. G., and that I. G. was authorized to acquire his shares in cancellation of the loan; and (6) A dividend agreement whereby the shareholder (who usually paid I. G. an interest of 6 percent on his loan) agreed to pay to I. G. any dividends received on his shares in excess of 6 percent, while I. G. agreed that the shareholder would receive à dividend rate of not less than 6 percent. It should be noted that by camouflaging companies in which I. G. had a direct interest, any subsidiaries of these companies were by the same token also camouflaged. Many other examples could be cited in which the most varied legal artifices were used: Nominees, fictitious or intervening transfers, pool agreements, endorsements in blank, escrow deposits, pledges, collateral loans, right of first refusal, management contracts, service contracts, creditor's rights, withheld know-how, and other devices. One reason advanced by officials of I. G. for the extreme lengths to which the technique of camouflage was carried was that Hermann Schmitz made every effort to live up to the sobriquet ascribed to him by some of his leading associates, “the master of financial camou At least in the early years of the war, the architects were satisfied with their handiwork, for in 1940 they were able to inform the German Government that their measures for camouflage "have proved to be very good during the war, and have even surpassed our expectations in numerous cases." ; It is interesting to note that the German tax authorities themselves were not informed of the details of these protective measures and from time to time attempted to assess the extent of I. G.'s foreign holdings. On one occasion they were urged by the company's lawyers, however, that injury to German interests could easily result from prosecuting such inquiries, and in the end the authorities did refrain from further investigation. The reasons for the refusal given at the time (to the tax authorities by I. G. officials) were that they feared most severe economic damage would result which must also have a detrimental effect on the German economy and on the German Page 23Page 24
his freedom of movement, while enemy nationals are frequently called into the This scheme was put into practice by I. G. officials all over the world. The specific legal devices used to place ownership apparently in the hands of independent persons and yet at the same time to retain effective control for I. G. were many and varied. For instance, sometimes they required the buyer of the shares to sign an option agreement giving I. G. an irrevocable right to repurchase his shares without notice. Often the prospective buyer chosen by I. G. would not have sufficient funds to acquire the shares. In such cases I. G. would lend the money to him and require him to sign, in addition to the option agreement: (a) An acknowledgment that the funds used had been loaned to him by I. G., and that I. G. was authorized to acquire his shares in cancellation of the loan; and (6) A dividend agreement whereby the shareholder (who usually paid I. G. an interest of 6 percent on his loan) agreed to pay to I. G. any dividends received on his shares in excess of 6 percent, while I. G. agreed that the shareholder would receive à dividend rate of not less than 6 percent. It should be noted that by camouflaging companies in which I. G. had a direct interest, any subsidiaries of these companies were by the same token also camouflaged. Many other examples could be cited in which the most varied legal artifices were used: Nominees, fictitious or intervening transfers, pool agreements, endorsements in blank, escrow deposits, pledges, collateral loans, right of first refusal, management contracts, service contracts, creditor's rights, withheld know-how, and other devices. One reason advanced by officials of I. G. for the extreme lengths to which the technique of camouflage was carried was that Hermann Schmitz made every effort to live up to the sobriquet ascribed to him by some of his leading associates, “the master of financial camou At least in the early years of the war, the architects were satisfied with their handiwork, for in 1940 they were able to inform the German Government that their measures for camouflage "have proved to be very good during the war, and have even surpassed our expectations in numerous cases." ; It is interesting to note that the German tax authorities themselves were not informed of the details of these protective measures and from time to time attempted to assess the extent of I. G.'s foreign holdings. On one occasion they were urged by the company's lawyers, however, that injury to German interests could easily result from prosecuting such inquiries, and in the end the authorities did refrain from further investigation. The reasons for the refusal given at the time (to the tax authorities by I. G. officials) were that they feared most severe economic damage would result which must also have a detrimental effect on the German economy and on the German Page 25Page 26
his freedom of movement, while enemy nationals are frequently called into the This scheme was put into practice by I. G. officials all over the world. The specific legal devices used to place ownership apparently in the hands of independent persons and yet at the same time to retain effective control for I. G. were many and varied. For instance, sometimes they required the buyer of the shares to sign an option agreement giving I. G. an irrevocable right to repurchase his shares without notice. Often the prospective buyer chosen by I. G. would not have sufficient funds to acquire the shares. In such cases I. G. would lend the money to him and require him to sign, in addition to the option agreement: (a) An acknowledgment that the funds used had been loaned to him by I. G., and that I. G. was authorized to acquire his shares in cancellation of the loan; and (6) A dividend agreement whereby the shareholder (who usually paid I. G. an interest of 6 percent on his loan) agreed to pay to I. G. any dividends received on his shares in excess of 6 percent, while I. G. agreed that the shareholder would receive à dividend rate of not less than 6 percent. It should be noted that by camouflaging companies in which I. G. had a direct interest, any subsidiaries of these companies were by the same token also camouflaged. Many other examples could be cited in which the most varied legal artifices were used: Nominees, fictitious or intervening transfers, pool agreements, endorsements in blank, escrow deposits, pledges, collateral loans, right of first refusal, management contracts, service contracts, creditor's rights, withheld know-how, and other devices. One reason advanced by officials of I. G. for the extreme lengths to which the technique of camouflage was carried was that Hermann Schmitz made every effort to live up to the sobriquet ascribed to him by some of his leading associates, “the master of financial camou At least in the early years of the war, the architects were satisfied with their handiwork, for in 1940 they were able to inform the German Government that their measures for camouflage "have proved to be very good during the war, and have even surpassed our expectations in numerous cases." ; It is interesting to note that the German tax authorities themselves were not informed of the details of these protective measures and from time to time attempted to assess the extent of I. G.'s foreign holdings. On one occasion they were urged by the company's lawyers, however, that injury to German interests could easily result from prosecuting such inquiries, and in the end the authorities did refrain from further investigation. The reasons for the refusal given at the time (to the tax authorities by I. G. officials) were that they feared most severe economic damage would result which must also have a detrimental effect on the German economy and on the German |
Which of the following can best be concluded about the United States involvement in the First World War based on the point of view expressed in the excerpt?
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