Teacher will provide a brief history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam—from the early Eisenhower support for the French up until the Gulf of Tonkin Incident—and frame the involvement within the context of the Cold War and the Containment Policy. The teacher will then point out that during the subsequent year (August, 1964 to August, 1965) the United States transitioned from simply supporting the South Vietnamese to actually fighting a full scale war. The teacher will then ask, how did this happen, and point out that the Constitution says that Congress has the authority to declare war. Did President Johnson ask for a declaration of war, the teacher will ask, and the “no” answer to that question will lead to the obvious question, where then did President Johnson get the authority to conduct this war? This will lead to a description and discussion of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident.
The teacher will then provide a copy of President Johnson’s speech to the nation on August 4, 1964, in which he discussed this incident and the United States’ response. The teacher will highlight the following excerpt: “I have today met with the leaders of both parties in the Congress of the United States and I have informed them that I shall immediately request the Congress to pass a resolution making it clear that our Government is united in its determination to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in southeast Asia.”
The teacher will then provide a copy of President Johnson’s message to Congress the following day, noting particularly his specific requests: “I recommend a Resolution expressing the support of the Congress for all necessary action to protect our armed forces and to assist nations covered by the SEATO Treaty . . . It could state in the simplest terms the resolve and support of the Congress for action to deal appropriately with attacks against our armed forces and to defend freedom and preserve peace in southeast Asia in accordance with the obligations of the United States under the southeast Asia Treaty.” The teacher will then provide a copy of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution—noting that it passed by a 416-0 vote in the House and an 88-2 vote in the Senate—and ask students if the President got what he wanted, and emphasizing the following excerpt: “. . . to take all measures necessary to repel armed attacks against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.” The teacher will then point out that during the following year, President Johnson ordered U.S. ground forces to join the fighting and initiated an aerial bombing campaign against North Vietnam, in effect beginning what has come to be known in the United States as the Vietnam War. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was his legal basis for taking these actions. The teacher will then ask the students whether or not they believe that such actions reflect Congress’ intent when it passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. The teacher will then discuss how opposition to the “war” grew in the United States during the following years—including among members of Congress—and point out that in January, 1971, Congress repealed the Gulf Of Tonkin Resolution, without any opposition from then President Nixon. The teacher will point out that in 1971, the “war” was still going on, but that the Nixon administration used Article 2 in the Constitution to justify the President’s policy in Vietnam; not the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. This will lead to a brief discussion of the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief under Article 2. The teacher will then ask students if they think that Congress was upset because President Johnson seemed to have taken advantage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to wage the so-called Vietnam War, which was not its intent. The teacher will then ask, what could Congress do to try and insure that such a situation would not happen again? This will lead to a discussion of the War Powers Resolution, a copy of which the teacher will provide. The teacher will ask, what is the intent of this, and how does it attempt to limit the President’s use of the military? The teacher will also ask, does this attempt to give Congress a greater role in the President’s use of the military? Finally, the teacher will point out that this was enacted by Congress in July, 1973, after the United States had ended its involvement in Vietnam. The teacher will ask students how they think President Nixon felt about the War Powers Act, and then point out that President Nixon vetoed the War Powers Act, but that Congress over-rode his veto by a vote of 284-135 in the House and 75-18 in the Senate.
This could lead to a discussion of the concept of checks and balances, or a discussion of how future presidents dealt with the War Powers Act, most notably Clinton and the two Bushs.
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, in 1964, was a major turning point in United States military involvement in Vietnam.
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident occurred in August 1964. North Vietnamese warships purportedly attacked United States warships, the U.S.S. Maddox and the U.S.S. C. Turner Joy, on two separate occasions in the Gulf of Tonkin, a body of water neighboring modern-day Vietnam. President Lyndon Baines Johnson claimed that the United States did nothing to provoke these two attacks and that North Vietnam was the aggressor. Subsequent reports show that the United States actually provoked these attacks by supporting South Vietnamese commandos operating in North Vietnam and by using U.S. warships to identify North Vietnamese radar stations along the coastline of North Vietnam. There remains no doubt that the North Vietnamese attacked the U.S.S. Maddox in the first incident, which occurred on August 2, 1964, although it does appear that the United States provoked this attack.
The second attack, which took place on August 4, 1964, continues to be the subject of debate. There are witnesses who say the attack took place, and those who said it did not. Because it took place during the night, the details are uncertain. Operational commanders on the two ships in the Gulf of Tonkin that night were convinced an attack did take place. Eyewitness evidence from highly trained, experienced sailors, marines, and commanders reveals radar detection of torpedo boats, searchlights from a North Vietnamese boat, thick black smoke from the target, and lights from boats moving at high speeds. A detailed investigation and testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations included a ranking North Vietnamese commander who reported he participated in the attack and stated that it did take place. However, the National Security Agency (NSA) chose to declassify more than 140 top-secret documents and oral history interviews and concluded that there was no second attack on U.S. ships in Tonkin by the North Vietnamese torpedo boats. This was based on historian Robert Hanyok’s research and analysis citing no concrete signal intelligence evidence of an attack. There was no naval command-and-control communications or target-radar emissions as there had been in the August 2nd attack. He said there was only confused and conflicting testimony of the men on board and the equipment involved in the incident. Over the years, interviews have taken place to clarify the events related to the incidents.
Because of President Johnson's claims, the United States Congress issued the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. This proclamation authorized Johnson to retaliate for the alleged attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin. The resolution allowed the president "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom." In essence, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution permitted Johnson to increase the United States' involvement in North and South Vietnam. Before Johnson became president, approximately sixteen thousand Americans were acting as advisors to the South Vietnamese military. Historians debate whether or not these soldiers were simply acting as advisors or were actually waging war against South Vietnamese revolutionaries and their North Vietnamese allies. Nevertheless, after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident Johnson increased the number of American troops serving in South Vietnam to more than 500,000. These men and women were clearly engaged in actual fighting.
The United States' escalation in the Vietnam War had a tremendous impact on Ohioans. Hundreds of thousands of Ohioans were members of the armed forces during the Vietnam War, although not all of these men and women served in North or South Vietnam. Of the Ohioans serving in the military, 2,997 of them died in Vietnam, while another twenty thousand suffered wounds. Beallsville, Ohio, lost more people per capita in the Vietnam War than any other community in the United States. Other Ohioans actively protested the war, especially once the federal government eliminated college deferments and it became common knowledge that the United States military was also bombing countries neighboring Vietnam. The most famous protest occurred at Kent State University, where the Ohio National Guard killed four people, but other protests erupted at college campuses across Ohio and the rest of the nation as well.
See Also
Lyndon Johnson signed the Tonkin Gulf resolution on August 10, 1964.
In August 1964, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf resolution—or Southeast Asia Resolution, as it is officially known—the congressional decree that gave President Lyndon Johnson a broad mandate to wage war in Vietnam. Its passage was a pivotal moment in the war and arguably the tipping point for the disaster that followed. The resolution, passed by Congress on August 7, 1964, and signed into law on August 10, capped a series of events that remain controversial.
On August 4, two American destroyers, the USS Maddox and C. Turner Joy, reported being attacked by North Vietnamese military units in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of central and North Vietnam. (The Maddox had reported similar action on August 2.) Characterizing the attacks as “unprovoked,” President Johnson ordered retaliatory strikes against North Vietnam and asked Congress to sanction any further action he might take to deter Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. Believing the administration’s account of these events, legislators acted swiftly, giving Johnson a virtual “blank check” to use US military force in Vietnam.
As frustratingly incomplete and often contradictory reports flowed into Washington, several high-ranking military and civilian officials became suspicious of the August 4 incident and began to question whether the attack was real or imagined. By the time that Johnson signed the Tonkin Gulf resolution on August 10, several senior officials—and probably the president himself—had concluded that the attack of August 4 had likely not occurred.
As news of the August 2 attack by a North Vietnamese PT boat on the Maddox reached Washington, administration officials publicly characterized the incident as unprovoked aggression. Privately, however, President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara conceded that US covert operations in the Gulf of Tonkin had probably provoked the North Vietnamese.
Facing pressure on the right for a large-scale military response and from the left for disengagement, and not wanting to be forced down either path, Johnson used key bits of information to influence the political debate. To the most vocal critics on the right calling for a forceful retaliation, Johnson and his senior advisors quietly sent word that US covert operations in the region had probably provoked the North Vietnamese attacks. In public, however, the administration vehemently denied such claims and went to considerable lengths to discredit them, maintaining the official line that the attacks were unprovoked.
[transcript here.]August 4, 1964
As real-time information flowed in to the Pentagon from the Maddox and Turner Joy, the story became more and more confused.
Admiral US Grant "Oley" Sharp, commander in chief, US Pacific Command, fed reports to Washington as soon as he received them. In this phone call, Sharp briefed Air Force Lt. General David Burchinal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the latest information he was receiving. This call was recorded at the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon. It is one of several related NMCC recordings released by the LBJ Library in June 2002.
August 6, 1964
Having spent the morning testifying to congressional committees, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara updated President Johnson about the mood on Capitol Hill regarding the Tonkin Gulf resolution. Despite a few dissenting voices on both sides of the aisle, McNamara reported that congressional support for the measure was strong.
[transcript here]Election-year politics complicated the administration's response. While criticism from the likes of Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater was expected, Johnson was forced to contend with a renegade voice much closer to the White House.
President Johnson, McNamara, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk were all trying to convince Congress and the American public that the North Vietnamese attacks were unprovoked, but Hubert Humphrey, Johnson's presumed running mate in the upcoming election, broke with the administration line and revealed the classified, covert role that the United States had been playing to support South Vietnamese sabotage raids against North Vietnam in the Tonkin Gulf.
[transcript here]They need not have worried. The following day, August 7, the Tonkin Gulf resolution passed Congress; Johnson signed it on August 10. The stage was now set for the "wider war" Johnson had said he would not seek.
Nearly six years later, on June 24, 1970, long after Johnson's presidency had become another casualty of the Vietnam War, the US Senate rescinded the Tonkin Gulf resolution. "The vote may have marked a turning point in the increasingly acerbic bickering in the Senate over the war," said the New York Times the following day. The Nixon administration was unperturbed, saying it was not relying on the resolution to authorize its policies in Vietnam.
*Adapted from a Miller Center article written by David Coleman and Marc Selverstone.