What did the Supreme Court find unconstitutional in the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act?

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337.

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PRINTZ, SHERIFF/CORONER, RAVALLI COUNTY, MONTANA v. UNITED STATES
Oral argument
Opinion of the court
Concurring opinion
Dissenting opinion

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

PRINTZ, SHERIFF/CORONER, RAVALLI COUNTY, MONTANA v. UNITED STATES

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit

No. 95-1478. Argued December 3, 1996 -- Decided June 27, 1997

[n.*]

Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act provisions require the Attorney General to establish a national system for instantly checking prospective handgun purchasers' backgrounds, note following 18 U.S.C. § 922 and command the "chief law enforcement officer" (CLEO) of each local jurisdiction to conduct such checks and perform related tasks on an interim basis until the national system becomes operative, §922(s). Petitioners, the CLEOs for counties in Montana and Arizona, filed separate actions challenging the interim provisions' constitutionality. In each case, the District Court held that the background check provision was unconstitutional, but concluded that it was severable from the remainder of the Act, effectively leaving a voluntary background check system in place. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding none of the interim provisions unconstitutional.

Held:

1. The Brady Act's interim provision commanding CLEOs to conduct background checks, §922(s)(2), is unconstitutional. Extinguished with it is the duty implicit in the background check requirement that the CLEO accept completed handgun applicant statements (Brady Forms) from firearms dealers, §§922(s)(1)(A)(i)(III) and (IV). Pp. 4-34.

(a) Because there is no constitutional text speaking to the precise question whether congressional action compelling state officers to execute federal laws is unconstitutional, the answer to the CLEOs' challenge must be sought in historical understanding and practice, in the Constitution's structure, and in this Court's jurisprudence. P. 4.

(b) Relevant constitutional practice tends to negate the existence of the congressional power asserted here, but is not conclusive. Enactments of the early Congresses seem to contain no evidence of an assumption that the Federal Government may command the States' executive power in the absence of a particularized constitutional authorization. The early enactments establish, at most, that the Constitution was originally understood to permit imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce federal prescriptions related to matters appropriate for the judicial power. The Government misplaces its reliance on portions of The Federalist suggesting that federal responsibilities could be imposed on state officers. None of these statements necessarily implies--what is the critical point here--that Congress could impose these responsibilities without the States' consent. They appear to rest on the natural assumption that the States would consent, see FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 796, n. 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). Finally, there is an absence of executive commandeering federal statutes in the country's later history, at least until very recent years. Even assuming that newer laws represent an assertion of the congressional power challenged here, they are of such recent vintage that they are not probative of a constitutional tradition. Pp. 4-18.

(c) The Constitution's structure reveals a principle that controls these cases: the system of "dual sovereignty." See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457. Although the States surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal Government, they retained a residuary and inviolable sovereignty that is reflected throughout the Constitution's text. See, e.g., Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76. The Framers rejected the concept of a central government that would act upon and through the States, and instead designed a system in which the State and Federal Governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people. The Federal Government's power would be augmented immeasurably and impermissibly if it were able to impress into its service--and at no cost to itself--the police officers of the 50 States. Pp. 18-22.

(d) Federal control of state officers would also have an effect upon the separation and equilibration of powers between the three branches of the Federal Government itself. The Brady Act effectively transfers the President's responsibility to administer the laws enacted by Congress, Art. II, §§2 and 3, to thousands of CLEOs in the 50 States, who are left to implement the program without meaningful Presidential control. The Federal Executive's unity would be shattered, and the power of the President would be subject to reduction, if Congress could simply require state officers to execute its laws. Pp. 22-23.

(e) Contrary to the dissent's contention, the Brady Act's direction of the actions of state executive officials is not constitutionally valid under Art. I, §8, as a law "necessary and proper" to the execution of Congress's Commerce Clause power to regulate handgun sales. Where, as here, a law violates the state sovereignty principle, it is not a law "proper for carrying into Execution" delegated powers within the Necessary and Proper Clause's meaning. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166. The Supremacy Clause does not help the dissent, since it makes "Law of the Land" only "Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance [of the Constitution.]" Art. VI, cl. 2. Pp. 24-25.

(f) Finally, and most conclusively in these cases, the Court's jurisprudence makes clear that the Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program. See, e.g., New York, supra, at 188. The attempts of the Government and the dissent to distinguish New York--on grounds that the Brady Act's background check provision does not require state legislative or executive officials to make policy; that requiring state officers to perform discrete, ministerial federal tasks does not diminish the state or federal officials' accountability; and that the Brady Act is addressed to individual CLEOs while the provisions invalidated in New York were directed to the State itself--are not persuasive. A "balancing" analysis is inappropriate here, since the whole object of the law is to direct the functioning of the state executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of dual sovereignty; it is the very principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law offends. See e.g., New York, supra, at 187. Pp. 25-34.

2. With the Act's background check and implicit receipt of forms requirements invalidated, the Brady Act requirements that CLEOs destroy all Brady Forms and related records, §922(s)(6)(B)(i), and give would be purchasers written statements of the reasons for determining their ineligibility to receive handguns, §922(s)(6)(C), require no action whatsoever on the part of CLEOs such as petitioners, who are not voluntary participants in administration of the federal scheme. As to them, these provisions are not unconstitutional, but simply inoperative. Pp. 34-36.

3. The Court declines to address the severability question briefed and argued by the parties: whether firearms dealers remain obliged to forward Brady Forms to CLEOs, §§922(s)(1)(A)(i)(III) and (IV), and to wait five business days thereafter before consummating a firearms sale, §922(s)(1)(A)(ii). These provisions burden only dealers and firearms purchasers, and no plaintiff in either of those categories is before the Court. P. 36.

66 F. 3d 1025, reversed.

Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., and Thomas, J., filed concurring opinions. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined.

Printz v. United States is a case decided on June 27, 1997, by the United States Supreme Court holding that it is unconstitutional to require state and local officials to conduct background checks on firearms purchasers. The case concerned whether the interim provision of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act violated the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[1][2][3]

HIGHLIGHTS

The case: An interim provision in the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act required state and local law enforcement officers to perform background checks on handgun applicants until a national system for background checks was fully operational. Two county sheriffs from Montana and Arizona filed lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the provision.

The issue: Can Congress enact an interim provision to require state officials to enforce a federal regulatory program?

The outcome: The Supreme Court ruled that it was unconstitutional to require state and local officials to conduct background checks on firearms purchasers.

Why it matters: The Supreme Court's decision in this case established that requiring state and local officials to conduct background checks on firearms purchasers violates the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. To read more about the impact of Printz v. United States click here.

Background

The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act established a national system for performing background checks on handgun applicants. An interim provision was implemented to require state and local law enforcement officers to perform such background checks until the national system was in effect.

County sheriffs from Montana and Arizona filed lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the provision. Two district courts ruled that the provision was unconstitutional, but ordered a voluntary background check system to remain in place. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district courts' rulings and argued that the provision to require state and local law enforcement officials to perform background checks was constitutional. A writ of certiorari was filed for the Supreme Court to review the case.[1][3]

Oral argument

Oral argument was held on December 3, 1996. The case was decided on June 27, 1997.[1]

Decision

The Supreme Court decided 5-4 to reverse the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the court, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas. Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas wrote concurring opinions. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer. Justice David Souter filed a separate dissenting opinion and Justice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens.[3]

Opinions

Opinion of the court

Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the court, argued that the Necessary and Proper Clause of the U.S. Constitution does not grant the federal government the authority to require states to enforce federal laws. Scalia contended that Congress' authority to require or prohibit certain acts cannot be used to make states require or prohibit those acts, thus prohibiting Congress from asking state and local officials to perform background checks.[3]

“	The dissent of course resorts to the last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action, the Necessary and Proper Clause. It reasons, post, at 3-5, that the power to regulate the sale of handguns under the Commerce Clause, coupled with the power to 'make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,' Art. I, §8, conclusively establishes the Brady Act's constitutional validity, because the Tenth Amendment imposes no limitations on the exercise of delegated powers but merely prohibits the exercise of powers 'not delegated to the United States.' What destroys the dissent's Necessary and Proper Clause argument, however, is not the Tenth Amendment but the Necessary and Proper Clause itself. When a 'La[w] . . . for carrying into Execution' the Commerce Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in the various constitutional provisions we mentioned earlier, supra, at 19-20, it is not a 'La[w] . . . proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause,' and is thus, in the words of The Federalist, 'merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation' which 'deserve[s] to be treated as such.' The Federalist No. 33, at 204 (A. Hamilton). See Lawson & Granger, The 'Proper' Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L. J. 267, 297-326, 330-333 (1993). We in fact answered the dissent's Necessary and Proper Clause argument in New York: '[E]ven where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts. . . . [T]he Commerce Clause, for example, authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of interstate commerce.' [4]	”
—Antonin Scalia, majority opinion in Printz v. United States[5]

Scalia used the ruling in New York v. United States (1992) to further his argument that the federal government cannot make states enact federal regulatory programs. Based on this previous ruling, Scalia contended that the interim provision in the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act was unconstitutional.[3][5]

“	We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State's officers directly. The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no case by case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty. [4]	”
—Antonin Scalia, majority opinion in Printz v. United States[5]

Concurring opinion

Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, argued that despite finding the interim provision unconstitutional, states could still voluntarily participate in the background check regulations.[3]

“	Our precedent and our Nation's historical practices support the Court's holding today. The Brady Act violates the Tenth Amendment to the extent it forces States and local law enforcement officers to perform background checks on prospective handgun owners and to accept Brady Forms from firearms dealers. See ante, at 922. Our holding, of course, does not spell the end of the objectives of the Brady Act. States and chief law enforcement officers may voluntarily continue to participate in the federal program. Moreover, the directives to the States are merely interim provisions scheduled to terminate November 30, 1998. Note following 18 U. S. C. § 922. Congress is also free to amend the interim program to provide for its continuance on a contractual basis with the States if it wishes, as it does with a number of other federal programs. [4]	”
—Sandra Day O'Connor, concurring opinion in Printz v. United States[3]

Justice Clarence Thomas, in a concurring opinion, emphasized that the Tenth Amendment highlights the fact that the federal government has limited powers. Thomas noted that this limitation may require future consideration of the federal government's authority under the Commerce Clause.[3][5]

“	The Court today properly holds that the Brady Act violates the Tenth Amendment in that it compels state law enforcement officers to 'administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.' See ante, at 25. Although I join the Court's opinion in full, I write separately to emphasize that the Tenth Amendment affirms the undeniable notion that under our Constitution, the Federal Government is one of enumerated, hence limited, powers. [4]	”
—Clarence Thomas, concurring opinion in Printz v. United States[5]

Dissenting opinion

Justice John Paul Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, argued that the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Commerce Clause of the Constitution grant authority to the federal government to regulate the commerce of handguns and enlist the support of state and local law enforcement officers to do so.[3][5]

“	Article I, §8, grants the Congress the power to regulate commerce among the States. Putting to one side the revisionist views expressed by Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995), there can be no question that that provision adequately supports the regulation of commerce in handguns effected by the Brady Act. Moreover, the additional grant of authority in that section of the Constitution '[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers' is surely adequate to support the temporary enlistment of local police officers in the process of identifying persons who should not be entrusted with the possession of handguns. In short, the affirmative delegation of power in Article I provides ample authority for the congressional enactment. [4]	”
—John Paul Stevens, dissenting opinion in Printz v. United States[5]

Stevens contended that the interim proposition of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act supported cooperative federalism and should therefore be supported as a way of serving the people of the United States.[5]

“	The provision of the Brady Act that crosses the Court's newly defined constitutional threshold is more comparable to a statute requiring local police officers to report the identity of missing children to the CrimeControl Center of the Department of Justice than to an offensive federal command to a sovereign state. If Congress believes that such a statute will benefit the people of the Nation, and serve the interests of cooperative federalism better than an enlarged federal bureaucracy, we should respect both its policy judgment and its appraisal of its constitutional power. [4]	”
—John Paul Stevens, dissenting opinion in Printz v. United States[5]

Justice David Souter, in a dissenting opinion, highlighted The Federalist No. 27 to argue that the federal government has the authority to require state officials to perform national functions.[3]

“	In deciding these cases, which I have found closer than I had anticipated, it is The Federalist that finally determines my position. I believe that the most straightforward reading of No. 27 is authority for the Government's position here, and that this reading is both supported by No. 44 and consistent with Nos. 36 and 45. Hamilton in No. 27 first notes that because the new Constitution would authorize the National Government to bind individuals directly through national law, it could 'employ the ordinary magistracy of each [State] in the execution of its laws.' The Federalist No. 27, p. 174 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). Were he to stop here, he would not necessarily be speaking of anything beyond the possibility of cooperative arrangements by agreement. But he then addresses the combined effect of the proposed Supremacy Clause, U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, and state officers's oath requirement, U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 3, and he states that 'the Legislatures, Courts and Magistrates of the respective members will be incorporated into the operations of the national government, as far as its just and constitutional authority extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.' The Federalist No. 27, at 174-175 (emphasis in original). The natural reading of this language is not merely that the officers of the various branches of state governments may be employed in the performance of national functions; Hamilton says that the state governmental machinery 'will be incorporated' into the Nation's operation, and because the 'auxiliary' status of the state officials will occur because they are 'bound by the sanctity of an oath,' id., at 175, I take him to mean that their auxiliary functions will be the products of their obligations thus undertaken to support federal law, not of their own, or the States', unfettered choices. [4]	”
—David Souter, dissenting opinion in Printz v. United States[3]

Justice Stephen Breyer, in a dissenting opinion, argued that the Constitution does not prohibit the federal government from assigning duties to state officials. Breyer also posited that the request made in the Brady Act is reasonable and therefore should be adhered to in order to help solve a national problem.[3]

“	As comparative experience suggests, there is no need to interpret the Constitution as containing an absolute principle--forbidding the assignment of virtually any federal duty to any state official. Nor is there a need to read the Brady Act as permitting the Federal Government to overwhelm a state civil service. The statute uses the words 'reasonable effort,' 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2)--words that easily can encompass the considerations of, say, time or cost, necessary to avoid any such result. Regardless, as Justice Stevens points out, the Constitution itself is silent on the matter. Ante, at 7, 18, 25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Precedent supports the Government's position here. Ante, at 19, 23-25, 26-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting). And the fact that there is not more precedent--that direct federal assignment of duties to state officers is not common--likely reflects, not a widely shared belief that any such assignment is incompatible with basic principles of federalism, but rather a widely shared practice of assigning such duties in other ways. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (spending power); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70 (1984); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) (general statutory duty); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (pre emption). See also ante, at 4-5 (Souter, J., dissenting). Thus, there is neither need nor reason to find in the Constitution an absolute principle, the inflexibility of which poses a surprising and technical obstacle to the enactment of a law that Congress believed necessary to solve an important national problem. [4]	”
—Stephen Breyer, dissenting opinion in Printz v. United States[3]